Special Events@PED

Interdisciplinary Conference: Recent Developments in Evolutionary Game Dynamics

This conference was organized by Drew Fudenberg and Martin Nowak, and was held at One Brattle Square, Harvard University.

DateName/AffiliationTitle
5 Nov
2004
Peter Taylor
Department of Mathematics and Statistics
University of Melbourne
Is it better to go first?
Yoh Iwasa
Department of Biology
Kyushu University
Evolutionary game theory of moral judgement: Indirect reciprocity realized by reputation dynamics.
Karl Sigmund
Institute for Mathematics
University of Vienna
Indirect reciprocity.
Martin Nowak
Harvard Program for Evolutionary Dynamics
Games on graphs.
Drew Fudenberg
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Evolutionary dynamics with recurrent mutations.
Lorens Imhof
Institute of Statistics
University of Aachen
Discrete and continuous stochastic models in evolutionary game theory.
6 Nov
2004
Ross Cressman
Department of Mathematics
Wilfrid Laurier University
Coevolution, adaptive dynamics, and the replicator equation for a single species with a continuous trait space.
Jorgen Weibull
Department of Economics
Stockholm School of Economics
Group selection and social preferences.
Larry Samuelson
Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison
The evolution of focal points.
Matt Jackson
Department of Economics
California Institute of Technology
Robust belief equilibrium and a study of how groups play games.
Josef Hofbauer
Department of Mathematics
University College London
Time averages in the replicator dynamics.
William Sandholm
Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin
Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics and stable games.

Dynamo: phase diagrams for evolutionary dynamics.