On Mar 24, 2006, PED Seminar Series Presents

Evolution of cooperation in continuous space public goods games

by Joe Yuichiro Wakano, PhD

Investment in common resource shared by all players is difficult to evolve even if the return is larger than the invested amount because a non-investor (free-rider) always receives more than an investor (altruist). The situation is referred to as the tragedy of the commons and often observed in various biological systems including environmental problem in human society. Punishment and reputation are effective but require individual identification. Volunteering is also effective but participation in the game is inevitable if common resource is vital for survival and reproduction. Here we focus on the case in which common resource has its own spatiotemporal dynamics. We construct an integrated model of a reaction diffusion equation and individual based simulation. In this model, the effect of investment will spatially diffuse and the return will not be shared completely equally by all players. We show that the evolution of altruism is possible. Especially, strong altruism can evolve (In strong altruism, the benefit which an investor receives from its own investment is smaller than the amount it invested). The condition for the evolution of altruism is discussed.

Joe's research interests include: evolutionary game theory, spatial pattern formation and evolution of social learning and cooperation.

You can contact him at: joe@biol.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp

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